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‘His home is his castle. And mine is a cage’:
a new partial defence for primary victims
who kill
NIcoLA WAke2
Senior Lecturer in Law, Northumbria University
NILQ 66(2): 151–77
She said ‘I’m savin’ up my money and when I get the nerve I’ll run
But Jim don’t give up easily so I intend to buy a gun
He will never see the way he treats me is a crime
Somebody oughta lock him up but I’m the one ‘Who’s done the time’3
Abstract
This article provides an in-depth analysis of  the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Act
2014 which had the effect of  repealing the Australian state of  Victoria’s only general ‘partial defence’ of
defensive homicide, and replaced the existing statutory self-defence in murder/manslaughter provisions and
general common law self-defence rules with a single test. The abolition of  defensive homicide means there is now
no general ‘partial defence’ to accommodate cases falling short of  self-defence. The change is likely to mean that
some primary victims will find themselves bereft of  a defence. This is the experience in New Zealand where the
Family Violence Death Review Committee recently recommended the reintroduction of  a partial defence, post-
abolition of  provocation in 2009. Primary victims in New Zealand are being convicted of  murder and
sentences are double those issued pre-2009. Both jurisdictions require that a new partial defence be introduced,
and accordingly, an entirely new defence predicated on a fear of  serious violence and several threshold filter
mechanisms designed to accommodate the circumstances of  primary victims is advanced herein. The proposed
framework draws upon earlier recommendations of  the Law Commission for England and Wales, and a
comprehensive review of  the operation of  ss 54 and 55 of  the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, but the novel
framework rejects the paradoxical loss of  self-control requirement and sexed normative standard operating
within that jurisdiction. The recommendations are complemented by social framework evidence and mandatory
jury directions, modelled on the law in Victoria. A novel interlocutory appeal procedure designed to prevent
unnecessary appellate court litigation is also outlined. This bespoke model provides an appropriate via media
and optimal solution to the problems faced by primary victims in Victoria and New Zealand.
NILQ summer 2015
1 Ariel Caten, ‘A Man’s Home Is His Castle’ (lyrics) on Faith Hill’s album, It Matters To Me (1995). 
2 I am incredibly grateful to Professor Warren Brookbanks (University of  Auckland, New Zealand), Associate Professor
Thomas Crofts (University of  Sydney, Australia), Ben Livings (Senior Lecturer, University of  New England, Australia),
Associate Professor Arlie Loughnan (University of  Sydney, Australia) and Professor Alan Reed (Associate Dean for
Research and Innovation, Northumbria University) for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of  this article.
Elements of  this paper were presented to the Sydney Law School, Institute of  Criminology (Nicola Wake, ‘Extreme
Provocation and Loss of  Control: Comparative Perspectives’ 18 March 2015). I thank members of  the institute for
their thoughtful contributions on that presentation. Any errors or omissions remain my own.
3 Caten (n 1).
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Introduction
The Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Act 2014 (the 2014 Act)abolished the Australian state of  Victoria’s only general ‘partial defence’4 of  defensive
homicide and replaced the existing statutory self-defence in murder/manslaughter
provisions and general common law self-defence rules with a single test.5 In the absence of
a partial defence, self-defence becomes an all-or-nothing claim, where a successful plea
results in an outright acquittal, and an unsuccessful plea results in conviction for the offence
charged. The 2014 Act also expanded the admissibility of  social framework evidence (which
includes, inter alia, the history of  the relationship, cumulative impact of  family violence, and
social, economic and cultural factors that may impact on a family member) from homicide
to all self-defence cases.6 These amendments were complemented by the introduction of
new juror directions in cases involving family violence.7 Despite the aims of  the Victorian
Department of  Justice (VDoJ), this ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to self-defence may have
unintended consequences in practice, with significant ramifications in intimate partner
homicide cases.8
This article commends the amendments to self-defence, but the impact of  these
reforms ‘should not be overstated’.9 The existence of  a partial defence is necessary to
capture cases that fall outside the scope of  self-defence, but do not warrant the murder
label.10 The evaluation undertaken by jurors in determining whether a partial defence
applies can serve an important role in assessing societal opinion of  the killing, thereby
assisting the sentencing judge in imposing sentence.11 It also has the effect of  involving
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4 The conviction was actually for defensive homicide, rather than a reduction from murder to manslaughter
(although the effect was to substitute a murder conviction with the lesser offence); the Crimes Amendment
(Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Act 2014, s 3(4). 
5 Ss 322N and 322K of  the 2014 Act abolished common law (s 322N) and statutory versions of  self-defence
(Crimes (Homicide) Act 1958, ss 9AC (self-defence in murder cases) and 9AE (self-defence in manslaughter
cases)).
6 Crimes Act 1958, s 322J, as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Act
2014. For a detailed exposition of  the relational nature of  domestic violence, see Thom Brooks, Punishment
(Routledge, 2012) ch 10.
7 Jury Directions Act 2013, ss 31 and 32, as amended by the Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive
Homicide) Act 2014, pt 4. 
8 This article takes as its main focus cases of  female on male intimate partner homicide, addressing the potential
impact of  the absence of  an applicable partial defence. It should be noted, however, that the impact is relevant
to both male and female defendants, both of  whom may suffer from domestic abuse. The feminine pronoun
will also be used throughout this article when referring to the primary victim, but this should not be
interpreted as implying that only women may be considered the primary victim, nor should it be read as
implying that the partial defence(s) are gender-specific. For a definition of  the term ‘primary victim’, see page
153 below. For an excellent analysis of  defensive homicide cases involving male defendants see, Kellie Toole,
‘Self-defence and the Reasonable Woman: Equality before the New Victorian Law’ [2012] 36 Monash
University Law Review 250.
9 Hansard, Legislative Council, Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Bill 2014, second
reading, 7 August 2014, Ms Pennicuik (Southern Metropolitan) 2419 citing Debbie Kirkwood, Mandy
McKenzie, Libby Eltringham, Danielle Tyson, Bronwyn Naylor, Chris Atmore and Sarah Capper, ‘Submission
on the Department of  Justice’s Defensive Homicide: Proposals for Legislative Reform-Consultation Paper’
(2013).
10 For a detailed analysis of  potential partial defences, see Thomas Crofts and Danielle Tyson, ‘Homicide Law
Reform in Australia: Improving Access to Defences for Women who Kill their Abusers’ (2013) 39 Monash
University Law Review 864.
11 See, generally, Family Violence Death Review Committee (FVDRC), Fourth Annual Report (2014).
jurors in an important ‘dialogue with the legislature and prosecutors’.12 A comparative
analysis with the position in New Zealand demonstrates that primary victims are being
convicted of  murder and sentenced more harshly than if  a partial defence was available.
The Family Violence Death Review Committee (FVDRC) defines the primary victim as an
individual experiencing ‘ongoing coercive and controlling behaviour from their intimate
partner’. The predominant aggressor is the principal aggressor in the relationship who ‘has
a pattern of  using violence to exercise coercive control’.13 These terms will be used
throughout this article. New Zealand has a restrictive sentencing regime and tighter self-
defence provision than Victoria, but these differences do not detract from the unfairness in
labelling the primary victim a murderer.14 As Quick and Wells point out, evading the
stigmatic murder label is often as important to primary victims as the sentence imposed.15
It is essential that Victoria and New Zealand adopt a more nuanced approach to
reforming homicide defences. The introduction of  a bespoke partial defence or offence
predicated on a fear of  serious violence provides a novel via media and optimal solution to
the problems faced by primary victims within Victoria and New Zealand. These innovative
proposals draw upon earlier recommendations of  the Law Commission for England and
Wales, in addition to an in-depth review of  the operation of  ss 54 and 55 of  the Coroners
and Justice Act 2009 (the 2009 Act), as enacted.16 The entirely new partial defence would
operate to reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter where the defendant kills in
response to a fear of  serious violence from the victim against the defendant or another
identified individual.17 The defence is qualified by appropriate threshold filter mechanisms
designed to preclude the availability of  the defence in unmeritorious cases. These clauses
include a ‘normal person’ test and provisions stipulating that the defence is not available
where the defendant intentionally incited serious violence, acted in a considered desire for
revenge or on the basis that no jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the
defence might apply.18 In cases where sufficient evidence is raised that the partial defence
might apply, it is then for the prosecution to disprove the defence to the usual criminal
standard. The defence is complemented by bespoke provisions on social framework
evidence and mandatory juror directions where family violence is in issue. A new
interlocutory appeal procedure that would serve to prevent unnecessary appellate court
litigation is also advanced. The following analysis demonstrates not only the need for such
a partial defence within Victoria and New Zealand, but also the extent to which this newly
proposed model provides an advantageous framework for reform.
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12 Mike Redmayne, ‘Theorising Jury Reform’ in Antony Duff, Lindsay Farmer, Sandra Marshall and Victor
Tadros (eds), The Trial on Trial vol II (Hart 2006) 102, cited in Thomas Crofts, ‘Two Degrees of  Murder:
Homicide Law Reform in England and Western Australia’ (2008) 8(2) Oxford University Commonwealth Law
Journal 187–210, 198.
13 FVDRC (n 11) 6. These terms are useful in that they are gender-neutral but, as Hamer identifies, they could
not be used in a forensic context. My thanks to Associate Professor David Hamer (University of  Sydney) for
making this point. See also n 8 above on use of  the feminine pronoun in this article. 
14 For detailed discussion on the abolition of  provocation and the restrictive sentencing regime operating in New
Zealand, see Warren Brookbanks, ‘Partial Defences to Murder in New Zealand’ in Alan Reed and Michael
Bohlander (eds), Loss of  Control and Diminished Responsibility: Domestic, Comparative and International Perspectives
(Ashgate 2011) 271–90.
15 Oliver Quick and Celia Wells, ‘Getting Tough with Defences’ [2006] Criminal Law Review 514. See also Crofts
and Tyson (n 10).
16 Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No 290 2004); Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter
and Infanticide (Law Com No 304 2006).
17 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 54(3).
18 Ibid s 54(5)–(6).
The decision to abolish partial defences in Victoria
In 2005, defensive homicide replaced provocation in a move intended to send a clear
message that killings borne of  male possessiveness, envy and rage were unacceptable.19 The
Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) recommended abolition at a time when the
Court of  Appeal was considering the case of  Ramage.20 Ramage claimed he had lost control
and killed his estranged wife, Julie, when she asserted that sex with him ‘repulsed her’, and
said she was happy with another man.21 In a ‘dramatic’ display of  ‘victim blaming’ the trial
became ‘an examination, and ultimately crucifixion’ of  Julie, where her new relationship,
marital unhappiness and comments regarding her life without Ramage were closely
scrutinised.22 Julie was unhappy as a result of  Ramage’s controlling and oppressive
behaviour and the violence he inflicted on her, but a significant amount of  abuse evidence
was excluded on grounds that it was temporally too remote and/or ‘potentially highly
prejudicial’.23 Morgan’s observation that ‘dead women tell no tales, tales are told about
them’ is a remarkably apt epithet of  the case.24 Convicted of  manslaughter, Ramage was
sentenced to 11 years’ imprisonment, but released after a minimum non-parole period of
8 years. Following sentence, Julie’s sister expressed her disappointment, noting that a
murder conviction would have resulted in a higher sentence.25 The recommendations of  the
VLRC, coupled with public outrage regarding the decision reached in Ramage, influenced
the abolition of  the partial defence.26
In the absence of  provocation, the VLRC considered a new partial defence of  excessive
self-defence necessary to accommodate killings in response to domestic abuse, should self-
defence fail.27 The government responded by introducing defensive homicide. Designed to
apply to ‘understandable over-reaction’ scenarios, murder could be reduced to defensive
homicide where the defendant killed believing it necessary to defend herself/another, but
reasonable grounds for that belief  were absent.28 The test asked jurors to assess whether
the defendant believed her conduct was necessary to defend herself/another from death or
really serious injury. If  jurors concluded the defendant held that belief, or the prosecution
failed to disprove that beyond reasonable doubt, the defendant would be acquitted of
murder, and jurors were required to determine her liability for defensive homicide. The
defendant would be guilty where the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt the
defendant had no reasonable grounds for the belief.29
The repeated use of  defensive homicide in cases involving one-off  violent
confrontations between men of  comparable strength meant that defensive homicide might
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19 VLRC, Defences to Homicide: Final Report (2004) (comments on provocation). Note, the VLRC recommended
the introduction of  excessive self-defence, not defensive homicide.
20 Ibid; Ramage [2004] VSC 508 [22] (Osborn J).
21 Ramage (n 20) [40] (Osborn J).
22 Graeme Coss, ‘The Defence of  Provocation: An Acrimonious Divorce from Reality’ [2006] 18(1) Current
Issues in Criminal Justice 51, 54. See also, Phil Cleary, Getting Away with Murder: The True Story of  Julie Ramage’s
Death (Allen & Unwin 2005) 136.
23 Ramage [2004] VSC 391 [46] (Osborn J).
24 Jenny Morgan, ‘Critique and Comment: Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are
Told about Them’ (1997) Melbourne University Law Review 237.
25 AAP, ‘Provoked Wife Killer Gets 11 Years’ Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney 2004). 
26 Ibid. 
27 VLRC (n 19) 102.
28 Ibid para 3.101, citing Supplementary Submission 27 (Criminal Bar Association). 
29 Ibid 12–13.
be perceived to have failed to produce the results intended.30 The offence was criticised as
inherently complex, difficult to apply, and lacking common sense.31 It had the effect of
diverting attention away from the (in)adequacy of  self-defence. Popular opinion was heavily
influenced by evocative media reports, lamenting deals that could ‘get potential murderers
off  the hook’, and advocating ‘a stronger voice for crime victims’.32 Men who ‘escaped’
potential murder convictions include: Dambitis,33 who killed his victim with lumps of  wood
and his fists two days after being released from prison; Giammona,34 who stabbed another
prison inmate 16 times; a schizophrenic man who killed two men believing he was the clone
of  Hitler or Hitler’s grandson;35 Smith,36 who, in a drug-induced psychosis, stabbed his
victim 50 to 60 times because he allegedly called him gay and threatened him; and a drug
addict, with 91 previous convictions, who killed his victim during the course of  a drug-
related robbery.37
Between 2005 and 2014, there were 33 convictions for defensive homicide in Victoria:
28 out of  33 were of  men; 32 out of  the 33 victims were men; and 27 out of  the 28 men
killed another man; meaning that only five women were convicted of  the offence.38 It was
the case of  Middendorp,39 together with a comprehensive review produced by the VDoJ,
which operated as a catalyst for abolition. Middendorp was convicted of  defensive
homicide after he brutally stabbed his estranged partner, Jade, to death because she
attempted to bring a male friend into their home. According to Middendorp, Jade
threatened him with a knife and, because of  earlier violence, he believed he needed to
defend himself  from death or serious injury. The relationship was plagued by alcohol and
physical abuse. Earlier reports by Jade indicated that Middendorp was responsible for the
violence, but Middendorp blamed Jade, and her reliability was questioned at trial, where she
was obviously unable to defend herself.40 Like Julie Ramage, it was Jade who was put on
trial when she was described as ‘a troubled young woman’ who deserved the ‘prospect of
growing out of  her [drug and alcohol] addiction’.41 At the time of  the killing, Middendorp
was subject to bail conditions and a family violence intervention order as a result of  several
alleged offences against Jade.42 Middendorp was described as over 6 feet tall and 90kg,
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30 VDoJ, Defensive Homicide: Review of  the Offence of  Defensive Homicide (VDoJ Discussion Paper 
2010) 36.
31 VDoJ, Defensive Homicide: Proposals for Legislative Reform (VDoJ Consultation Paper 2013). See also, Adrian Lowe,
‘New Calls for State to Overhaul Homicide Laws’ (2010) The Age 6; and, Geoff  Wilkinson and Courtney
Crane, ‘A Law Meant to Protect Women Is Being Abused by Brutal Men’ Herald Sun (Melbourne 2012) citing
Kate Fitz-Gibbon and Sharon Pickering.
32 Michael, ‘Deals Could Get Potential Murderers off  the Hook in Victoria’ Herald Sun (Melbourne 2012);
Robert Clark, ‘Giving a Stronger Voice to Crime Victims’ Herald Sun Law Blog (Melbourne 2012).
33 [2013] VSCA 329.
34 [2008] VSC 376.
35 Ball [2014] VSC 669.
36 [2008] VSC 617 [9].
37 Taiba [2008] VSC 589. See, generally, Matt Johnson, ‘Killer Blow: Defensive Homicide Laws Hijacked by
Thugs Will Be Scrapped’ Herald Sun (Melbourne 2014). 
38 Hansard, Legislative Assembly, Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Bill 2014, second
reading, 3 September 2014, Mr McCurdy, Murray Valley, 3144. For a contextual analysis of  these figures see,
DVRCV, Justice or Judgement? The Impact of  Victorian Homicide Law Reforms on Responses to Women Who Kill Intimate
Partners (DVRCV Discussion Paper No 9 2013).
39 [2010] VSC 202.
40 Ibid [7].
41 Ibid [17].
42 Ibid [4]. 
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compared to Jade who was smaller and weighed approximately 50kg.43 Middendorp
wrestled the knife from Jade and stabbed her four times in the shoulder before she managed
to stagger from the house. Witnesses observed Middendorp follow her, shouting, ‘she got
what she deserved’, and calling her ‘a filthy slut’.44
The facts in Middendorp bore the hallmarks of  a brutal killing borne out of  anger, sexual
jealousy and male possessiveness. Middendorp was sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment
with a minimum non-parole period of  8 years. The verdict was vituperatively criticised as
‘laughable’, ‘too lenient’, ‘unsatisfactory’ and ‘all about provocation’.45 There was
widespread concern that the precedent might result in similar verdicts in other femicide
cases. The case coincided with the VDoJ’s review which concluded that the offence had
been inappropriately used as a vehicle to drive provocation-type arguments; the (unclear)
benefit to having defensive homicide for primary victims was substantially outweighed by
the expense of  inappropriately excusing men who kill; and the shift in emphasis from self-
defence to defensive homicide implied that the primary victim’s response was irrational
rather than reasonable in the circumstances.46 Shortly thereafter, the offence was abolished
by the 2014 Act.
The decision to abolish defensive homicide was not unanimously supported. Indeed, a
number of  eminent scholars have advocated that reform should have focused upon plea-
bargaining practice in Victoria, rather than the relatively embryonic operation of  defensive
homicide.47 Middendorp is one of  a limited number of  defensive homicide convictions
reached by jury verdict. In this respect, it is apparent that any partial defence needs to be
framed in order to ensure that it is left to the jury in appropriate cases. The vast majority of
defensive homicide convictions were achieved via plea bargains, mandating that the Crown
withdraw related homicide charges.48 Although plea-bargaining is an expeditious and
financially beneficial way of  obtaining a conviction, the lack of  transparency associated with
this prosecutorial discretion circumvents juror – and therefore social – evaluation as to
whether an individual should be convicted of  murder or manslaughter. It also prevents
effective analysis of  the reasons for accepting such pleas.49 This lack of  transparency fuelled
‘public perceptions of  clandestine outcomes, inequality and a lack of  accountability’ in
relation to the application of  defensive homicide.50
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2)
43 Middendorp [10].
44 Ibid [9].
45 Adrian Howe, ‘Another Name for Murder’ (2010) The Age; Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Defensive Homicide Law
Akin to Getting Away with Murder’ The Australian (Sydney 2012). Middendorp’s subsequent appeal against
conviction and sentence was unanimously dismissed; Middendorp [2012] VSCA 47.
46 VDoJ (n 31) viii–ix, and 27–8.
47 Kirkwood et al (n 9).
48 Hansard, Legislative Assembly, Crimes Amendment (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Bill 2014, second
reading, 3 September 2014, Mr Pakula (Lyndhurst), 3135.
49 Asher Flynn and Kate Fitz-Gibbon, ‘Bargaining with Defensive Homicide: Examining Victoria’s Secretive
Plea Bargaining System Post-Law Reform’ (2011) 35 Melbourne University Law Review 905. See also, Kate
Fitz-Gibbon, Homicide Law Reform, Gender and the Provocation Defence: A Comparative Perspective (Palgrave
Macmillan 2014).
50 Flynn and Fitz-Gibbon (n 49) 907. Flynn and Fitz-Gibbon suggest that best practice guidelines modelled on
the Attorney General’s ‘Acceptance of  Pleas and the Prosecutor’s Role in the Sentencing Exercise’ framework
operating in England and Wales would assist in improving transparency, thereby ensuring that pleas are
accepted only in appropriate cases. See also, Kirkwood et al (n 9) 8, and Debbie Tyson, Sex, Culpability and the
Defence of  Provocation (Routledge 2013).
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Amendments to self-defence: attempting to compensate for the lack of a 
partial defence?
The prospect of  having no partial defence for primary victims highlighted the need to
improve the law on self-defence and evidence admissibility. The 2014 Act replaced the
existing statutory self-defence provisions relating to murder/manslaughter51 and the
general common law self-defence rules with a single test.52 Self-defence represents an ‘all-
or-nothing’ claim, where a successful plea results in an outright acquittal, and an
unsuccessful plea results in conviction for the offence charged. This effectively mirrors the
law of  England and Wales.53 The test requires that the defendant believed force was
necessary in self-defence and the conduct was reasonable in the circumstances as perceived
by the defendant.54 The introduction of  s 322M of  the 2014 Act implies that self-defence
may be more accessible to primary victims in Victoria than it currently is in England and
Wales. Section 322M specifies that, in cases involving family violence, self-defence may
apply even where the threat is not imminent, or the force used is excessive.55 The
assumption is that reformulated self-defence will capture deserving cases, while other cases
where self-defence is unsuccessfully raised will be considered during sentencing.56 In
murder cases, s 322K(3) requires that the defendant believed the conduct was necessary in
order to defend herself/another from death or really serious injury. Section 322L further
precludes the availability of  the defence where the victim’s conduct is lawful, and the
defendant knows that the conduct is lawful at the time.57
The emphasis on family violence under s 322M challenges the stereotypical notion of
self-defence as a one-off  confrontation between two individuals of  equal strength. It
reflects contemporary recognition that a more nuanced approach must be adopted in cases
where the primary victim wards off  a physically stronger aggressor in a non-traditional self-
defence situation. Ramsey heralded the Victorian provisions on self-defence as a radical and
trendsetting example of  feminist-inspired reform.58 The cases of  SB, in which a nolle
prosequi was entered, and Dimotrovski, which resulted in a magistrates’ discharge, have been
‘cautiously’ cited as evidence that earlier amendments to self-defence are working in
practice.59 Yet, the assumption that these cases demonstrate success of  the new provisions
‘may be premature’.60 SB shot her stepfather after he demanded oral sex from her at
gunpoint. Dimostrovski stabbed her husband after he hit her in the face, pushed her to the
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51 See n 5.
52 Ibid.
53 Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 76. 
54 Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 322K, as amended by the Crimes (Abolition of  Defensive Homicide) Act 2014.
55 This effectively re-enacts and expands the scope of  s 9AH of  the Crimes (Homicide) Act 2005 (the 2005 Act)
beyond homicide cases. It should be noted that a lack of  imminence will not necessarily bar a successful self-
defence claim in England and Wales; Attorney General for Northern Ireland’s Reference (No 1 of  1975) [1977] AC
105 (HL). Nor does the defendant have to ‘weigh to a nicety the exact measure of  his defensive action’; Palmer
[1971] AC 814; Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, s 76(7).
56 See Crofts and Tyson (n 10) 865.
57 This effectively replicates s 9AF of  the 2005 Act (now repealed).
58 Carolyn Ramsey, ‘Provoking Change: Comparative Insights on Feminist Homicide Law Reform’ (2010) 100(1)
Journal of  Criminal Law and Criminology 32–108 (commenting on earlier amendments to self-defence under
the 2005 Act).
59 See, Crofts and Tyson (n 10) 884. 
60 Toole (n 8) 270. 
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ground and attacked their daughter.61 These cases did not proceed to trial because it was
recognised that both defendants were acting in self-defence; their actions complied with
‘traditional notions of  self-defence’.62 The problems presented by judicially invented
constructs of  imminence and proportionality were not at issue.63
Even with bespoke provisions dedicated to the unique circumstances of  family violence,
some primary victims may find themselves bereft of  a defence in homicide cases. Abolition
of  both provocation and defensive homicide renders self-defence ‘an all or nothing roll of
the dice for women in these circumstances, and if  they are unable to convince the court that
self-defence has been made out, then what these women will face is conviction for
murder’.64 Despite the problems associated with defensive homicide, a number of  legal
practitioners, academics and key stakeholders identified that abolition would be a
‘retrograde step’.65 ‘Introduced for sound reasons’, defensive homicide provided ‘a very
important and compelling safety net for women who experience, and respond to family
violence’;66 removal of  that safety net on grounds that men have been inappropriately using
it, in male-on-male combat, unfairly disadvantages primary victims.67
Five women were convicted of  defensive homicide, all of  whom might have faced a
murder conviction had the offence been abolished.68 One of  the most recent female-on-
male defensive homicide convictions did not involve family violence or a relationship
between the defendant and victim. Copeland,69 a 24-year-old heroin addict and prostitute,
stabbed her 68-year-old client in the back and left, taking $420 from his wallet. According
to Copeland, she feared that she would be raped or killed when he threatened her with a
knife during an argument regarding payment. It was ‘quite impossible’ to tell exactly what
happened, but had the evidence supported Copeland’s version of  events, self-defence
would have been available.70 The media labelled Copeland a ‘drug addled prostitute’,71 and
the sentencing judge was unsympathetic towards the mental illness from which she suffered.
Maxwell J noted that there was ‘no particular feature of  Copeland’s drug dependency which
made it peculiarly or unusually intractable’.72
Copeland is clearly very different from the other female defensive homicide convictions
that have involved significant history of  abuse in intimate partner relationships.
Consideration of  a defendant’s recognised medical condition would require the
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2)
61 See, Kim Stevens, ‘Breakthrough Case – Dismissed Murder Charge Defence Successful under New Laws’
Shepparton News (Shepparton 8 May 2009) 3, cited in VDoJ (n 30) 31–2, paras 108–9.
62 Danielle Tyson, Sarah Capper and Debbie Kirkwood, ‘Submission to Victorian Department of  Justice, Review
of  the Offence of  Defensive Homicide’ (2010) 8. 
63 Toole (n 8) 270.
64 Ramsey (n 58). See also, Caroline Forell, ‘Gender Equality, Social Values and Provocation Law in the United
States, Canada and Australia’ (2006) 14(1) Journal of  Gender, Social Policy and the Law 27–71. Hansard (n 38)
Mr Pakula (Lyndhurst) 3137.
65 Hansard (n 38) Ms Graley (Narre Warren South) 3146, citing Mary Crooks and Sarah Capper of  the Victorian
Women’s Trust.
66 Kirkwood et al (n 9) 1.
67 Ibid 8. See also, VDoJ (n 30) viii, ix and 29.
68 DVRCV, Defensive Homicide an Essential Safety Net for Victims (DVRCV 2014). See, Williams [2014] VSC 304;
Copeland [2014] VSC 39 (11 February 2014); Edwards [2012] VSC 138; Creamer [2011] VSC 196; and Black
[2011] VSC 152. 
69 Copeland (n 68).
70 Ibid.
71 Mark Russell, ‘Drug-addled Prostitute Jailed for Kitchen Knife Killing’ (2014) The Age.
72 Copeland (n 68) [65]. 
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introduction of  a new partial defence equivalent to s 2 of  the Homicide Act 1957, as
amended, and not one predicated on a fear of  serious violence.73 It might be appropriate
to consider a defendant’s recognised medical condition as part of  the circumstances of  the
individual case where he/she fears serious violence, considered further below.74 The
remaining defensive homicide convictions of  primary victims illustrate the need for a partial
defence based upon a fear of  serious violence.
It has been suggested that the availability of  defensive homicide, or an alternative partial
defence, may result in defendants pleading guilty to a lesser offence rather than risk a
murder conviction in claiming self-defence. It is also possible that a halfway house
potentially encourages compromise manslaughter verdicts based upon an ostensible
disproportionate use of  force, for example, where a primary victim uses a weapon to kill an
aggressor.75 The case of  Edwards76 reflects circumstances in which the availability of
defensive homicide may have prevented a successful self-defence claim. According to
Edwards, the predominant aggressor threatened her life and repeatedly punched and kicked
her in the days preceding the fatal attack. Edwards said:
I went to sleep for while, and I was hoping that it all would be over when I woke
up. And when I woke up, he was still drunk . . . and then . . . he said that he was
going to cut my eyes out and cut my ears off. And disfigure me. And then he said
he was going to get some petrol from out the back and he was going to set me
on fire and ruin my pretty face so that no one would look at me ever again. And
I panicked.77
‘Wild and angry’, the predominant aggressor approached Edwards brandishing a knife.
During the struggle that ensued, he lost his balance and fell. Edwards then grabbed the
knife and stabbed him. It was accepted that Edwards believed it was necessary to defend
herself, but her plea meant she accepted there were ‘no reasonable grounds’ to believe she
was in ‘danger of  death or serious injury’. The wounds inflicted were ‘a disproportionate
response to the threat’.78 The reforms might assist primary victims like Edwards to claim
self-defence, but there is ‘little evidence to suggest that self-defence would become more
accessible’.79 The prosecution case, in stark contrast to Edwards’ version of  events, was that
she stabbed her sleeping husband. In this respect, there was (and remains) a risk that jurors
might reject self-defence. In the absence of  a partial defence, defendants like Edwards
might be convicted of  murder. There is no guarantee that the absence of  a partial defence
will prevent primary victims from pleading ‘guilty to murder in order to receive a discounted
sentence’ in such cases. Of  course, the bargaining power of  defence counsel will be
substantially reduced in the absence of  a partial defence.80
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Designed to accommodate the circumstances of  primary victims, s 322M specifies that,
where family violence is in issue, a person may believe that conduct is necessary, and the
response may be reasonable in the circumstances as perceived by them, even if  the person
is responding to harm that is not immediate, or the response involves the use of  force in
excess of  the threatened or inflicted harm. Priest has criticised the provision as a
‘breathtaking extension’ of  self-defence:
Taken to their logical (or, perhaps, their illogical) conclusion, these new
provisions suggest that a number of  ‘trivial’ acts of  ‘harassment’ (whatever the
term might embrace) by a family member, which do not involve actual or
threatened abuse, might permit a person to use disproportionate force to kill that
family member even where ‘harm’ is not ‘immediate’.81
As Priest identifies, s 322M appears to imply a different approach in family violence cases.
This might have unintended consequences for defendants who find themselves in a
potentially analogous situation to vulnerable family members, but for failing to fall within
that category. For example, in the context of  terrorist/hostage, human trafficking, or
other situations where ‘the threat is not immediate, but . . . more remote in time’ or,
arguably, ongoing.82 In such situations ‘there may not be a need to prevent immediate
harm but rather an immediate need to act to prevent inevitable harm’.83 The Judicial
College of  Victoria, however, has suggested that the common law approach regarding
immediacy and the reasonableness of  the force used will continue to apply.84 In practice,
the provision reiterates the common law principle that when acting in the ‘agony of  the
moment’ the defendant does not need to ‘weigh to a nicety the exact measure of  his
necessary defensive action’.85 A similar clause recommended by the VLRC would have
been of  general application.86 The VLRC proposal extended necessity in self-defence to
cases where the defendant ‘fears inevitable, rather than immediate harm’. The provision
was intended to clarify the common law position that the significance of  the defendant’s
‘perception of  danger is not its imminence. It is that it renders the defendant’s use of
force really necessary.’87 In this respect, whether the defendant/victim is a family member
and/or family violence is in issue would be more appropriately categorised as a matter of
evidence rather than a principle of  law.88 The effect would be to extend s 322M to all self-
defence cases.
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It is important to note that s 322M does not apply only to abused women, but extends
to other family members. The 2014 Act defines ‘family member’ and ‘family violence’ in
wide terms in order that ‘a fairly broad cohort of  persons and circumstances’ may be
brought within the new test.89 The term family member covers current and former marital
relationships; intimate personal relationships; parental relationships (step or biological);
guardians; a child in residence; and a person who is or has been a member of  the household.
The definition of  family violence includes, inter alia, physical, psychological and sexual
abuse, which may manifest as a single act, or several acts amounting to a pattern of
behaviour.90 It is apparent that the broad ambit of  this element of  the defence may have
unintended consequences in practice.
However, the extent to which s 322M will change the substantive approach is
questionable. A provision similar to s 322M was introduced in England and Wales in
relation to the use of  force by householders.91 Where a defendant is protecting
herself/another against a trespasser, force will only be regarded as unreasonable if  it is
‘grossly disproportionate’. Herring points out that s 43 makes ‘little change to the law
because the jury would, even under the standard approach, take into account the emergency
of  the moment when considering whether a householder was acting reasonably and would
be likely to only find a grossly disproportionate amount of  force to be unreasonable’.92 The
clause has been heavily criticised as a ‘triumph of  rhetoric over reason’ and it highlights the
dangers associated with enacting legislation specific to discrete categories of  offender that
may do little to change the substantive approach.93 The primary victim might face similar
problems. As Hollingworth J identified in Williams:94
what happens in such cases is that the victim of  family violence finally reaches a
point of  explosive violence, in response to yet another episode of  being attacked.
In such a case, it is not uncommon for the accused to inflict violence that is
completely disproportionate to the immediate harm or threatened harm from the
deceased.95
A woman is more likely to use a weapon, and it is not uncommon for substantially more
strikes to be inflicted than may have objectively been reasonable to incapacitate a
man.96 Hollingworth J acknowledged that viewing the infliction of  16 blows with an axe
in response to a minor or trivial threat as being a very serious example of  an offence
might not be the right conclusion where the defendant has suffered a history of
abuse.97 This implies that greater weight will be attached to the impact of  family
violence during sentencing, but such a defendant might still be convicted of  murder. In
cases involving excess force, an appropriate partial defence is an essential safety net for
primary victims.
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The amendments to self-defence are complemented by new jury directions designed to
assist jurors to understand the impact of  abuse, and how this can evoke ‘possibly the worst
behaviour from everybody in an unbelievably hot-tempered, violent home where domestic
family violence is prevalent’.98 By requiring the trial judge to provide a direction on family
violence where it is requested by counsel, unless there are good reasons not to, these
amendments are targeted towards proactively tackling misconceptions regarding family
violence. The trial judge will explain, inter alia, that family violence may be relevant to
assessment of  whether the primary victim was acting in self-defence; and that family
violence may include sexual and psychological as well as physical abuse.99 Importantly, the
trial judge may inform jurors that there is no typical, proper or normal response to family
violence. Jurors are to be advised that it is not uncommon for a primary victim of  family
violence to remain with an abusive partner, or to leave and return to that partner; and/or
not to report or seek assistance to stop such conduct.100 Social framework evidence is no
longer limited to homicide cases and may extend to all self-defence claims. Amendments to
the Evidence Act 2008 mean that the court can refuse to hear evidence where it
unnecessarily demeans the victim.101 This change does not limit the use of  evidence
providing an important contextual narrative or where there are good forensic reasons for
its admission.102 The effect is to address ‘the despicable practice of  gratuitous blame
directed at victims during homicide trials’, while simultaneously allowing evidence relating
to family violence to be admitted.103
A partial defence is still necessary
These provisions undoubtedly serve an important educative function in assessing the
impact of  family violence on the primary victim, but the extent to which they will
affect the outcome of  self-defence cases remains unclear. In this respect, the impact
of  these changes ‘should not be overstated’.104 The case law demonstrates that there
continues to be only limited understanding of  the relationship between social
framework evidence and defences. Section 322M must be considered in light of  the
other elements of  self-defence; namely, that in murder cases the defendant must fear
death or really serious injury.105 In a detailed study of  intimate partner homicide
between 2005 and 2013, it was revealed that ‘there continues to be a focus on physical
forms of  violence and a lack of  understanding of  the serious impact of  non-physical
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forms of  intimate partner violence, such as psychological coercion and intimidation,
and sexual forms of  violence’.106 Black107 was convicted and sentenced to 9 years’
imprisonment after pleading guilty to the defensive homicide of  her de facto husband.
Black stabbed him after he cornered her in the kitchen, repeatedly jabbing her with his
finger. In evidence, Black said:
He was coming closer and closer to me . . . and I was thinking because he was so
drunk he would probably want to force himself  on me sexually . . . and I was just
thinking what else could he do.108
The sentencing judge noted that the aggressor was unarmed and that stabbing him twice
might be viewed as disproportionate.109 The threat was described as ‘being limited to
intimidation, harassment, jabbing and prodding’.110 Black’s appeal against sentence was
dismissed, the Court of  Appeal concluding that the sentencing judge was ‘justified in
making the observation that the violence which confronted the appellant was not as serious
as many of  the other cases’.111 The cumulative impact of  family violence and how it
contributed to Black’s perception of  the danger she faced was clearly misunderstood.112
Where domestic violence has become the norm, the primary victim will have an acute
awareness of  the danger that she is in at the time of  the act, but may subsequently
understate the impact of  that abuse. Black downplayed the violence she had suffered saying,
‘[h]e was never physically violent towards me, but he’d poke me with his fingers and point
at me and jab me in the chest and forehead. He would sometimes force himself  on me
sexually.’113 In the absence of  a partial defence, there is a real risk that the primary victim
will be convicted of  murder, particularly where the impact of  family violence is
misunderstood by the legal profession.
These concerns are compounded by the fact that a move to make juror directions
mandatory where family violence is at issue was rejected by the Victorian Parliament in
favour of  judicial flexibility.114 There is a mandate requiring the trial judge to give
directions where necessary to avoid substantial miscarriage of  justice, but failure to make
the family violence directions mandatory is arguably a missed opportunity. As Kirkwood
et al point out, mandatory directions would have ‘an educative value for the judiciary and
legal practitioners’, as well as assisting ‘judges to better direct juries when family violence
is led, when the implications of  the evidence are not spelled out by the defence, or when
the evidence is used to argue for reduced culpability rather than an acquittal’.115 The onus
rests on defence counsel to raise the issue, and, in practice, they will need to be,
‘sufficiently aware of  family violence and to raise it at an early stage to avoid damage
being done without it’.116 There is a risk that the new jury directions will be inconsistently
applied, with potentially significant consequences in terms of  juror decision-making.
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Jurors serve a vital role in such cases, but it is essential that appropriate guidance is
available in order to help them in that role.
This lack of  understanding at both a legislative and a practical level suggests that
separating genuine from fabricated facts in order to prevent victim blaming might be
difficult to achieve in practice.117 There was significant debate during the trial of  Creamer
as to whether she was a victim of  domestic violence.118 The relationship between Creamer
and the aggressor was described as ‘largely, if  not entirely, dysfunctional’.119 Each engaged
in extra-marital affairs, encouraged by the aggressor.120 The aggressor frequently requested
that Creamer engage in group sex, which she ‘resented strongly’.121 On the weekend of  the
killing, Creamer believed that the aggressor had arranged for her to engage in group sex.
According to her evidence, the aggressor had hit her in the genitals with a knobkerrie while
she was sleeping, accused her of  having sex with his brother, and insisted that she smell his
semen-stained sheets before placing them over her head.122 Immediately before the fatal
act, the aggressor repeatedly smacked Creamer in the face and threatened to ‘finish her off ’,
before attempting to push his penis in her mouth and urinating on her.123 Creamer
managed to hit the aggressor in the genitals before grabbing a knife and stabbing him to
death. The prosecution asserted that, rather than being a victim of  domestic abuse, Creamer
had initially denied her involvement in the killing because she had no excuse. She was
portrayed as being jealous of  the aggressor’s extramarital affairs and annoyed at his decision
to leave her for his former wife.124 The forensic evidence did not fully accord with
Creamer’s account, and the sentencing judge rejected a significant proportion of  her
evidence, describing her as an ‘unsophisticated witness’.125 In particular, Coghlan J
suggested that the jury had rejected Creamer’s allegation that she had been raped previously
by the aggressor because Creamer chose to stay with him and had not disclosed such
evidence prior to trial.126
Toole notes that the availability of  defensive homicide worked to Creamer’s
advantage. Rather than ‘being obsessive, jealous and controlling . . . her husband
encouraged and facilitated [Creamer’s] affairs’.127 In this respect, Toole argues that
defensive homicide had the ‘potential to both protect and criminalise lethal conduct by
women in inappropriate and unintended ways’.128 In contrast, the Domestic Violence
Resource Centre Victoria (DVRSV) contends that this assessment demonstrates a ‘lack of
understanding about how psychological manipulation, sexual degradation and coercive
control are forms of  family violence’.129 The primary victim may feel unable to disclose
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details of  abuse because ‘of  a deep sense of  shame and self-blame’.130 It is worrying that
such abuse continues to be viewed at the ‘lowest end of  the spectrum’.131 The
amendments to prevent victim blaming and fact fabrication are welcome, but it may be
difficult in practice to reliably distinguish genuine from disingenuous facts, particularly
given the hidden nature of  domestic abuse.
Irrespective of  the changes to self-defence, it remains clear that some defendants will
fall outside the scope of  self-defence simply because the force used was excessive. In such
cases, a reduction from murder to manslaughter may be apposite in terms of  appropriate
standardisation of  the defendant’s culpability level.132 The suggestion that lower
culpability may be reflected in sentencing mitigation where self-defence fails ignores the
injustice associated with labelling the primary victim a murderer where she genuinely
believed force was necessary, but was mistaken regarding the level of  force. The murder
label unfairly stigmatises those who kill their abusers and it ‘obscures the family violence
to which s/he has been subjected’.133 The Victorian Sentencing Council acknowledged
that the removal of  provocation would result in significantly higher sentences for
provoked killers, given the increased maximum penalty and stigma attached to murder.134
The same can be said of  the abolition of  defensive homicide. Experience in New Zealand
is that primary victims are being convicted of  murder and sentenced more harshly than
if  a partial defence was available.135
The impact of abolishing the partial defence in New Zealand
The New Zealand criminal justice system has been described as ‘out of  step internationally
in the way it responds when the victims of  family violence kill their abusers’.136 Last year,
the FVDRC noted that there needs to be a radical change in the way New Zealand deals
with ‘dangerous and chronic cases of  family violence’.137 In particular, the FVDRC
advocated reintroducing a partial defence to New Zealand, post-abolition of  the
provocation defence in 2009.138 The New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) had
previously recommended abolition, complemented by developments to the law on self-
defence. The NZLC advocated that priority should be given to drafting a new sentencing
guideline to ensure that ‘full and fair account’ may be taken of  provocative conduct and
other mitigating factors during sentencing.139 Provocation was abolished, but the remaining
recommendations were not taken forward. The result is that self-defence laws in New
Zealand remain demonstrably unsuited to primary victims who kill a predominant aggressor
and, despite appellate court guidance on the impact of  provocation in sentencing, primary
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victims are in a significantly worse position than if  a partial defence was available.140 As
Brookbanks stated:
By abolishing the provocation defence, the legislature has drawn a line in the
sand. Those who cross it, whatever their motive or disposition, can no longer
expect a sentencing court to look at their situation with such compassion or
understanding, as might have previously marked the court’s response as a
concession to their ‘human frailty’.141
The self-defence provision operating in New Zealand appears to reflect the approach
adopted in Victoria and England and Wales, but the manner in which it has been interpreted
renders it difficult for primary victims to successfully claim the defence.142 Section 48 of
the Crimes Act 1961 provides that: ‘[e]veryone is justified in using, in the defence of  himself
or another, such force, as in the circumstances as he believes them to be, it is reasonable to
use’.143 The relaxation of  the imminence requirement in Victoria and England and Wales
has not occurred in New Zealand, where ‘immediacy of  life-threatening violence’ is
required in order to justify killing in self-defence.144 In cases where the defendant had a
viable, non-violent option, the threat is not considered sufficiently imminent to satisfy self-
defence. This approach fails to recognise that when a primary victim kills an intimate
partner it will rarely be in the face of  an imminent attack, since by then ‘any attempt at self-
protection may be too late’.145 The apparently viable escape option is similarly not possible
for the primary victim who fears that she will be in even more danger should she attempt
to do so.146 The FVDRC noted that by focusing on the imminence of  the threat, the
primary victim’s circumstances are limited to a short time-frame. This results in vastly
different rulings in factually similar cases where self-defence is precluded in the absence of
an imminent threat.147 The problem with this arbitrary approach to culpability is that it
results in some primary victims being labelled murderers, while others receive an outright
acquittal. The availability of  a partial defence would assist in ameliorating this inherently
unjust bifurcatory divide between justified killings in response to an imminent threat and
ostensibly unjustified killings undertaken when a predominant aggressor is off-guard. The
circumstances of  the primary victim have been acknowledged to a limited extent in that
expert evidence is admissible to explain how she might be more aware of  covertly
threatening behaviour which may not appear objectively apparent. It remains clear, however,
that self-defence in its current form does not adequately accommodate the circumstances
of  primary victims.148 Like the VLRC, the NZLC recommended replacing the ‘imminence’
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requirement with the need for an ‘inevitable attack’, but these recommendations were not
acted upon.149
The absence of  a partial defence means that mitigating factors are considered solely
during sentencing in determining whether a life sentence would be ‘manifestly unjust’ and
in setting a minimum non-parole period. The restrictive sentencing regime operating in
New Zealand mandates that a murder conviction automatically attracts a life sentence,
unless the nature of  the offence and the circumstances of  the defendant would render such
a sentence ‘manifestly unjust’.150 The minimum non-parole period on a life sentence for
murder may not be less than 10 years or 17 years in the ‘most serious cases’.151 It is only in
‘limited circumstances when a finite sentence may be imposed’.152 There is no legislative
guidance on the impact of  the predominant aggressor’s conduct and/or provocation in
relation to the assessment of  whether to impose a life sentence, but the Court of  Appeal in
Hamidzadeh153 and Tauleki154 confirmed that both are potentially relevant mitigating
factors.155 In all cases, only ‘exceptional’ circumstances will result in the presumption of  life
imprisonment being overturned.
The type of  case in which the presumption has been rebutted include, inter alia,
mercy-killing cases156 and those involving serious domestic abuse.157 Sentences of  10
years’ and 12 years’ imprisonment were issued in the cases of  Rihia158 and Wihongi,159
respectively, which to date represent those cases in which a primary victim has been
convicted of  the murder of  a predominant aggressor post-abolition of  the provocation
defence.160 The low number is attributable to the rare cases in which a primary victim
responds with lethal force rather than signifying that this particular category of
defendant is being afforded an alternative defence.161 The horrific abuse and mental
impairments suffered by Rihia and Wihongi meant that their cases were ‘exceptional’.
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This resulted in the notorious presumption of  life imprisonment being overturned in
each case.162
A comparison between Rihia and the earlier manslaughter conviction of  Sualape
demonstrates the stark reality that primary victims are not only being convicted of  murder,
but sentences are double the length of  those imposed pre-2009 in factually similar cases.
Rihia was convicted and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment after she pleaded guilty to the
murder of  her estranged husband. Their relationship was plagued by violence and alcohol
abuse.163 They had been drinking heavily throughout the day, during the course of  which
their seven-year-old daughter was removed by Child, Youth and Family Service staff  over
concerns regarding the alcohol consumption and the predominant aggressor’s presence at
the property. Fearing a retaliatory beating, and angry at the predominant aggressor’s
involvement in the removal of  their daughter, Rihia stabbed him in the chest during the
course of  an argument.164
Psychologists described Rihia as suffering from ‘complex post-traumatic stress
disorder’ and ‘borderline personality disorder’ characterised by ‘alcohol abuse,
emotional dysregulation, outbursts of  anger, and feelings of  abandonment’ induced by
familial violence.165 Rihia’s parents were alcoholics and she had been removed from
their care as a consequence of  abuse. Rihia was abused by her first husband, with the
result that her seven children were taken into care.166 The ‘extreme reaction’ to Rihia’s
despair at losing her daughter was described by the sentencing judge ‘as being rooted
firmly in the abuse’ she had suffered from the predominant aggressor and others.167
There were 36 reported incidents of  violence between Rihia and the predominant
aggressor. Police confirmed that in 33 out of  the 36 cases the predominant aggressor
was responsible, and the court said it was ‘reasonable to infer that there were more than
only three or four incidents a year’.168 The trial judge was satisfied that Rihia would not
have killed ‘had it not been for the significant impairment’ she suffered through years
of  alcohol and physical abuse.169
Sualape, in contrast, received a sentence reduction of  7.5 years to 5 years on grounds
that the initial sentence did not reflect the cumulative impact of  the abuse and
degradation she suffered, in addition to her vulnerability by reason of  ethnic and cultural
background.170 Sualape successfully argued that she was provoked to kill her abusive
partner of  over two decades after he said he was leaving her for another woman. The
initial sentencing judge described the killing as ‘brutal’. Sualape had questioned the
predominant aggressor over his decision to leave her before repeatedly hitting him over
the head with an axe in what Randerson J dubbed a ‘frenzied attack’ with a ‘strong
element of  deliberation about it’.171 It was not accepted that Sualape suffered from
battered-woman syndrome and the degree of  physical and emotional abuse was deemed
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 66(2)
162 Hamidzadeh (n 151) 33. See also, Rapira [2003] 3 NZLRC 794 (CA) [121]. The assessment as to whether the
presumption is displaced must be undertaken in light of  ss 7–9 of  the Sentencing Act 2002







170 Sualape [2002] NZCA 6.
171 Ibid citing original ruling [6]–[8].
168
to be exaggerated.172 According to Randerson J, it was the sexual infidelity which proved
to be the main trigger for a killing on the borderline between murder and manslaughter.
The jury’s verdict was termed ‘merciful’ in the circumstances.173 That ‘merciful’ decision
resulted in a sentence 2.5 years shorter than that imposed in Rihia, despite Randerson J’s
obvious misgivings regarding the verdict.
Upon appeal, Baragwanath J concluded that Randerson J had not attached sufficient
weight to the family abuse suffered by Sualape. The appellant’s role in what was described
as a ‘chronically dysfunctional marriage’ was governed by ‘traditional Samoan norms’.174
The appellant was responsible for the care of  her four children from a previous marriage,
five children with the predominant aggressor, his disabled mother, and eight of  his brother’s
children whose wife had died.175 The relationship involved physical and emotional violence,
including bashings, cutting with a machete, and the infliction of  a venereal disease,
consequent upon repeated infidelities.176 The aggressor was a world-renowned tattoo artist,
popular for p’ea tattoos which are designed to display cultural identity, and commonly used
as part of  a ‘right [sic] of  passage’ ritual into manhood.177 On one occasion, he organised
a tattooist convention which was of  cultural significance to the local Samoan community,
in which the appellant’s family were prominent, and attended with a lover with whom he
‘cohabited openly’.178 It was said that this brought great shame to Sualape’s family.
Baragwanath J held that essential considerations ought to have included: the exemplary
past behaviour of  the primary victim; the cumulative impact of  the sustained pattern of
abusive and insulting conduct of  the predominant aggressor; the gross humiliation of  the
appellant and her family by the aggressor’s conduct in Samoa; and the appellant’s
perception, from what appeared to be a position of  subordination in both her relationship
and culture, of  a lack of  realistic options available effectively to relieve herself  of  what was
progressively becoming an intolerable burden.179 Sualape’s actions were ‘more than a
jealous response by a jealous wife, but the consequence of  the victim’s treatment of  her
over two decades, and of  her limited perception of  means by which it might be resisted’.180
Randerson J’s view reflected a narrow interpretation of  Sualape’s circumstances, which
focused principally on the fatal attack and the exchange between the primary victim and
predominant aggressor immediately preceding it. By labelling sexual infidelity as the
triggering event, Randerson J implied that Sualape’s conduct was undertaken in response to
the predominant aggressor’s attempt to exercise personal autonomy in leaving a relationship
to commence a new one. In reality, his sexual infidelity constituted the final straw in the
living nightmare he had inflicted on her, and it was this combination that eventually tipped
her over the edge. In this respect, it is essential that sexual infidelity is considered as part of
the narrative leading to the fatal act. More recently, the Court of  Appeal in Hamidzadeh181
recognised that the ‘circumstances in which sexual infidelity may be treated as reducing
culpability is a difficult issue’.182 Their Lordships noted Lord Judge CJ’s comments, in
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Clinton, on the sexual infidelity exclusion in the loss of  control defence.183 Lord Judge
acknowledged that:
Sexual infidelity has the potential to create a highly emotional situation or to
exacerbate a fraught situation, and to produce a completely unpredictable, and
sometimes violent response. This may have nothing to do with any notional
‘rights’ that the one may believe she or he has over the other, and often stems
from a sense of  betrayal and heartbreak, and of  crushed dreams.184
The Court of  Appeal, in Hamidzadeh concluded, however, that ‘while an angry and
emotional response to the end of  a relationship may be understandable, the ordinary
expectation of  the community is that this ought not to justify the use of  violence, especially
where there are fatal consequences’.185 The problem is that in cases like Sualape the sexual
infidelity and revelation that the relationship is at an end constitutes ‘an important and
relevant component of  the cocktail of  events’ that combined to make the defendant lose
control.186 The sexual infidelity served to humiliate and degrade the victim in circumstances
which she was powerless to prevent. In this respect, the sexual infidelity formed part of  the
domestic abuse, in a similar way that taunts designed to belittle or denigrate the victim do.
As the Court of  Appeal identified in Clinton, to ‘compartmentalise sexual infidelity and
exclude it when it is integral to the facts as a whole . . . is unrealistic and carries with it the
potential for injustice’.187
The ruling in Sualape also highlights the problems associated with focusing on a narrow
time-frame in domestic abuse cases. Despite Randerson J’s misgivings regarding the
mitigatory force of  the abuse Sualape suffered and the respective (lack of) weight attached
to sexual infidelity, the sentence imposed was significantly shorter than that imposed in the
similar case of  Rihia. The problem with considering mitigation solely at the sentencing stage
is that it circumvents important juror and therefore societal evaluation as to whether a
manslaughter verdict and a corresponding lower sentence ought to apply. The role of  the
jury in such cases represents an important ‘bulwark against overzealous prosecutors and
cynical judges’.188 The jury verdict confers ‘a societal stamp of  approval that must be given
weight’. It tends to result ‘in both a finite sentence, and a sentence that is likely to be
somewhat shorter than the lowest available minimum term for murder’.189 In all cases,
however, it is essential that the defence is appropriately framed and sufficient guidance is
provided to jurors in order for them to perform their role effectively.
The via media : a new partial defence
It is essential that New Zealand and Victoria adopt a more ‘nuanced and less black and
white approach to reforming of  the criminal defences to homicide’.190 An optimal solution
would be to introduce a new partial defence predicated on a fear of  serious violence.191 This
entirely new defence draws upon earlier recommendations of  the Law Commission for
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England and Wales, in addition to an in-depth review of  the operation of  ss 54 and 55 of
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, as enacted.192 The partial defence would operate to
reduce a murder conviction to manslaughter where the defendant kills in response to a fear
of  serious violence from the victim against the defendant or another identified
individual.193 The defence is qualified by appropriate threshold filter mechanisms designed
to preclude the availability of  the defence in unmeritorious cases. These clauses include a
normal person test and provisions stipulating that the defence is not available where the
defendant intentionally incited serious violence, acted in a considered desire for revenge, or
on the basis that no jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence
might apply.194 In cases where sufficient evidence is raised that the partial defence might
apply, it is then for the prosecution to disprove the defence to the usual criminal standard.
The defence should be complemented by bespoke provisions on social framework evidence
and mandatory juror directions where family violence is in issue. An interlocutory appeal
procedure designed to prevent unnecessary appellate court litigation is also outlined. The
following analysis illustrates that this novel model provides an appropriate via media for the
introduction of  a new partial defence to Victoria and New Zealand, with the added benefit
of  developments based upon the experience of  the operation of  the loss of  control defence
in England and Wales.
The proposed defence requires that the defendant feared serious violence from the
victim against the defendant or another identified individual. This mirrors the ‘fear trigger’
operating under the loss of  control defence.195 It is also similar to defensive homicide,
which required the defendant to fear death or really serious injury. The proposed defence is
designed to be available where the defendant kills in response to an anticipated (albeit not
imminent attack); and where the defendant over-reacts to what she perceived to be an
imminent threat.196 Whether the defendant feared serious violence engages an entirely
subjective enquiry.197 The fear must be genuine but it need not be reasonable. Arguably, it
would be difficult to prove that the fear was genuine if  it were not based on reasonable
grounds. There is no need to extend the defence to circumstances falling short of  serious
violence, but social framework evidence should be utilised to explain why an ostensibly
trivial incident might cause the primary victim to fear such violence.198 The term violence
should be broadly construed as including psychological199 and sexual harm, in addition to
physical violence.200 It should also include coercive or controlling behaviour as identified
under the Serious Crimes Act 2015, which introduced a new offence based on such
conduct.201 The offence provides overdue recognition of  the impact of  coercive and
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controlling practices, and it is appropriate that the definition of  serious violence under the
new defence incorporates this form of  conduct.202
A fundamental difference between defensive homicide and the newly proposed defence
is that defensive homicide remained unqualified by appropriate threshold filter mechanisms.
The proposed defence is qualified by the normal person test which mandates that a person
of  the defendant’s age, with a normal degree of  tolerance and self-restraint and in the
circumstances of  the defendant might have reacted in the same or a similar way.203 The
VLRC was critical of  the normal person test because it involves ‘speculation about how a
person might have reacted in the circumstances’.204 This approach is necessary because it is
impossible to say how a person would have reacted in the circumstances, particularly where
there is evidence of  domestic abuse.205 The proposed test is similar to the normal person
test operating in relation to the loss of  control defence, with the exception that the term
‘sex’ is omitted. Use of  the term ‘sex’ overstates the ‘role of  sex and gender in explaining
D’s reaction’.206 In this respect, sex and gender are better considered by the judge and jury
as part of  the broader circumstances of  the case.207 Akin to the loss of  control defence,
‘circumstances’ in this context is a reference to all of  the defendant’s circumstances other
than those whose only relevance to the defendant’s conduct is that they bear on her general
capacity for tolerance and self-restraint.208 In cases where the defendant has a recognised
medical condition relevant to her fear of  serious violence then that might, like sex and
gender, form part of  the circumstances for consideration.209 A normal degree of  tolerance
means that, in evaluating the defendant’s conduct, the jury cannot take into account
irrational prejudices, such as racism and homophobia.210 A normal degree of  self-restraint
excludes characteristics such as bad temper, jealousy, irritability and intoxication. Unlike the
loss of  control plea, the proposed defence specifically excludes self-induced intoxication
from the assessment of  the defendant’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint.211 This
statutory exclusion is designed to prevent unnecessary litigation in cases where the
defendant is voluntarily intoxicated.
In terms of  determining whether the proposed defence applies, the defendant’s fear of
serious violence is to be disregarded in cases where the defendant intentionally incited
serious violence. The intentional incitement clause is different from s 55(6)(a)–(b) of  the
2009 Act which stipulates that the defence will be unavailable where the defendant incited
something to be said or done for the purpose of  using it as an excuse to use violence. In
Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer, the Court of  Appeal held that the mere fact that the defendant was,
‘behaving badly and looking for and provoking trouble’ does not mean the defence is
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unavailable.212 This is because self-induced triggers are viewed in a narrow sense only for
the purposes of  the loss of  control defence.213 The exclusion will arguably only apply
where the defendant has ‘formed a premeditated intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm
to the victim, and incites provocation by the victim so as to provide an opportunity for
attacking him or her’.214 This approach was applied in Duncan,215 where a defendant
successfully claimed the partial defence after stabbing a love rival to death. Duncan was
shopping with his two children when he saw the victim. As a result of  seeing him, Duncan
purchased a small-bladed paring knife, removed the packaging and concealed it within a
carrier bag. His explanation was that some days before the victim had confronted him in a
similar location and threatened him with a knife. According to witnesses, Duncan then
proceeded towards the victim shouting at him. A fight ensued, during the course of  which,
the victim slashed Duncan across the face and body with a knife. It was at that point,
Duncan claimed to have momentarily lost self-control and stabbed the victim to death.
Duncan’s loss of  control plea was accepted by the Crown, Lord Thomas advocating that
the case should be seen:
As an acceptance of  a basis of  plea in a one-off  case in circumstances which we
have not gone in to. It should not be regarded as any precedent that where two
people arm themselves and a wound is caused in the course of  an intended knife
fight, that that would ordinarily give rise to a loss of  self-control.216
Despite the warning of  Lord Thomas, the case illustrates that the circumstances in which a
defendant’s conduct might be construed as having been done for the purpose of  using it as
an excuse to use violence are likely to be limited. The Law Commission of  England and
Wales opined that to exclude the defence ‘in the broader sense of  self-induced provocation
would be to go too far’.217 Such an approach might exclude deserving claims where the
incitement was induced by ‘morally laudable’ conduct, for example, ‘standing up for a victim
of  racism in a racially hostile environment’.218 The Law Commission did identify that ‘there
is much to be said . . . in denying a defence to criminals whose unlawful activities expose
them to the risk of  provocation by others’.219 The recommended intentional incitement
clause provides a via media between these ostensibly polarised approaches to self-induced
provocation.
The provision would operate where the defendant intentionally incited serious violence. The
defendant’s conduct must be done for the purpose of  inciting serious violence. In this
respect, the ‘mere fact that the defendant caused a reaction in others’ would not result in
the defence being excluded.220 The approach in Dawes, Hatter and Bowyer, that provocative
behaviour does not negate the defence, is equally applicable to the new proposal. This
ensures that confrontational circumstances do not automatically preclude the partial
defence, but, where the defendant intends to incite serious violence, the defence is
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precluded.221 This is important as the primary victim may feel responsible for inciting the
aggressor’s response because she is aware that doing X makes him angry, but it cannot be
said that it was her intention to have that effect. Contrary to the Law Commission’s
observation, judges and jurors would be in a position to ‘differentiate satisfactorily between
forms of  self-induced provocation in the broader sense which should, and which should
not, preclude a defence’.222 It is true that this would be a challenging task, given the
potential variables, but at present the exclusionary clause serves little purpose when viewed
in the narrow sense, since arguably cases of  premeditated killing would be excluded via
s 54(4) of  the 2009 Act in any event.
Section 54(4), which provides that the loss of  control defence is not available where the
defendant acted in ‘a considered desire for revenge’, forms part of  the proposed
framework.223 The clause operates to prevent the use of  the defence in premeditated, cold-
blooded killings, but it does not preclude the defence simply because the defendant was
angry at the victim for conduct which engendered a fear of  serious violence.224 The Royal
College of  Psychiatrists noted that:
Physiologically anger and fear are virtually identical, whilst many mental states
that accompany killing also incorporate psychologically both anger and fear . . .
[T]he abused woman who waits until the man is ‘helpless’ is likely, not merely to
be angry but also fearful that he will eventually kill her, and/or her children and
that there is no way of  preventing it other than by the death of  the man.225
The word ‘“considered” denotes something over and above simple revenge’226 and, as
such, the primary victim who claims ‘He deserved it!’ remains eligible to claim the
defence because jurors are in a position to distinguish genuine cases involving an
element of  retaliation from disingenuous claims.227 Nevertheless, it may be difficult ‘to
determine whether the killing was one motivated by a considered desire for revenge or
from other emotions’ and, for this reason, social framework evidence should be used to
explain why the primary victim may experience a complex array of  emotions at the time
of  the fatal act.228
The proposed legislative framework does not include the loss of  control requirement
which is integral to ss 54 and 55 of  the 2009 Act in England and Wales. By avoiding this
controversial requirement, the proposed partial defence is closely aligned with self-defence.
In cases where self-defence fails, the new partial defence might apply. At present, in
England and Wales, a defendant claiming self-defence on grounds of  a fear of  serious
violence may revert to a loss of  control claim where the initial plea fails.229 The problem is
that the defendant will have to revert from alleging that she was acting reasonably in the
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circumstances to asserting that she lost self-control. This is apt to cause juror confusion.230
Rejection of  the loss of  control requirement also avoids the inherent contradiction in
requiring the primary victim to simultaneously fear serious violence and lose self-control.
For these reasons, loss of  self-control does not form part of  the proposed defence herein.
The loss of  self-control requirement was introduced by the government of  England and
Wales in order to prevent the defence from being used inappropriately in cases of  cold-
blooded, gang-related or honour killings.231 A review of  jurisprudential authority suggests,
however, that a significant number of  loss of  control claims are being filtered out
unnecessarily by the loss of  self-control element. It is right that these claims are being rejected,
but the loss of  self-control requirement is unnecessary because these claims could be
filtered out by the alternative threshold filter mechanisms within the partial defence. As
previously stated, loss of  control and the newly proposed defence are unavailable where the
defendant ‘acted in a considered desire for revenge’.232 Lord Judge CJ, in Evans, advocated
that there ‘was no need to rewrite . . . the language of  the statute’.233 In all cases, ‘the greater
the level of  deliberation, the less likely it will be that the killing followed a true loss of  self-
control’.234 The ‘considered desire for revenge’ exclusion is a more appropriate instrument
for filtering out unmeritorious claims because, unlike the loss of  self-control mandate, the
‘words “considered”, “desire” and “revenge” are not words of  legal technicality. They are
words of  ordinary use.’235
The trial judge, in Jewell,236 refused to leave the partial defence to the jury where the
defendant prepared firearms and a survival kit 12 hours before he drove to the victim’s
home, armed with a shotgun and home-made pistol, and shot him without warning.237
Jewell’s explanation was that he feared serious violence from the victim who had allegedly
threatened to kill him the evening before. The killing ‘bore every hallmark of  a pre-
planned, cold-blooded execution’.238 There was a 12-hour ‘cooling period’ between the
alleged threat and the actual killing in which Jewell could have sought an alternative course
of  action, but failed to do so. The defence, however, was negated not by virtue of  s 54(4),
but by the loss of  self-control requirement. The trial judge considered the remaining
elements of  the defence ‘out of  an abundance of  caution’ but that assessment was
‘unnecessary as a dispositive conclusion’.239
The extent to which the loss of  self-control requirement impacts upon the utility of  the
alternative threshold filter mechanisms within the defence was similarly highlighted in the
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case of  Barnsdale-Quean.240 The defendant had purchased a rolling pin and chain two weeks
prior to the killing. On the day of  the killing, he collected the chain from a flat in which he
had stored it and the rolling pin from the kitchen. He tied two elasticated bands in a loop
at the end of  the chain, and carefully placed it over his wife’s head while she was subdued
due to antidepressant medication. He used the rolling pin as a tourniquet to strangle his wife
to death before stabbing himself  in an attempt to make it appear that she had committed
suicide after attacking him. Barnsdale-Quean claimed that he could not remember what had
occurred following his wife’s alleged attack. The trial judge ruled that there was no loss of
self-control on the facts or the defendant’s account. In the event that the defendant had lost
self-control, the defence would be negated by virtue of  s 54(4). The Court of  Appeal
advocated that it was unnecessary to reach a conclusion in respect of  s 54(4) because there
was no evidence of  loss of  self-control. These rulings demonstrate that s 54(4) is capable
of  filtering out unmeritorious cases in the absence of  the loss of  self-control requirement.
In all cases, should the outlined threshold filter mechanisms of  the proposed defence
be bypassed, the trial judge has the authority to reject a claim on the basis that no jury,
properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply.241 The grounds
for the plea would be considered at a pre-trial hearing under case-management procedures.
The implementation of  an interlocutory appeal route would mean that the trial judge’s
decision could be challenged (only) before trial, thereby preventing unnecessary appellate
court litigation.242 In cases where family violence is in issue, the trial judge will be charged
to provide juror directions equivalent to those operating in relation to self-defence in
Victoria, considered above; the difference being that these directions ought to be
mandatory. This will ensure that appropriate directions are consistently provided in all cases,
rather than relying on ad hoc requests made by counsel.
conclusion
The amendments to self-defence, social framework evidence and juror directions in Victoria
challenge the traditional male-oriented perception of  self-defence involving violent
confrontations between parties of  comparable strength. This view is incompatible with
killings in response to familial abuse and, as such, the changes in the law serve an educative
function, highlighting the need for greater understanding of  the circumstances of  the
primary victim in order to ensure that self-defence captures deserving cases outwith
traditional gender-biased notions of  self-defence. Nevertheless, there will continue to be
cases involving family violence that fall outside the scope of  revised self-defence. In the
absence of  an applicable partial defence, the primary victim may face a murder conviction
and longer sentence. This is the experience in New Zealand, post-abolition of  the
provocation defence in 2009. The injustice associated with labelling the primary victim a
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find that the defence applies. We regard it as significant that of  the provocation cases studied . . . in the two
involving honour killing both the accused were convicted of  murder. We are confident that that result would
be no different under our recommendations.’; Law Commission No 304 (n 16) para 5.27. See also, paras
5.11(5), 5.25–32, and 5.60. Lord Judge identified that the fear trigger implies a higher threshold test than the
common law had; Thornley [2011] EWCA Crim 153 [15] cited in R v Lodge [2014] EWCA Crim 446.
242 Law Commission No 304 (n 16) para 5.16.
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murderer and the longer sentences imposed have resulted in calls for the reintroduction of
a partial defence within that jurisdiction. The risk that primary victims may be convicted of
murder is unacceptable, irrespective of  the sentencing regime operating in these
jurisdictions.
The introduction of  a new partial defence, predicated on a fear of  serious violence,
provides an appropriate via media and optimal solution within both jurisdictions. The newly
proposed framework would sit cogently alongside developments to self-defence in Victoria,
providing a more comprehensive package of  defences covering the potential various
circumstances in which a primary victim may respond with lethal force. For New Zealand,
the proposed defence is far removed from provocation and earlier concerns regarding the
operation of  that defence. It ensures that a partial defence is available to the primary victim
who kills fearing serious violence from a predominant aggressor. The novel defence is
restricted by the threshold filter mechanism of  the normal person test, and alternative
clauses stipulating that the defence is not available where the defendant intentionally incited
serious violence, acted in considered desire for revenge, or on the basis that no jury,
properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply.243 These
proposals should be complemented by social framework evidence and mandatory juror
directions, similar to those operating in Victoria. This would ensure that the partial defence
is available only in deserving cases. A new interlocutory appeal procedure would provide
defendants with an opportunity to challenge the judge’s refusal to admit the defence prior
to trial, thereby preventing unnecessary appellate court litigation. The abolition of  all
general partial defences in Victoria and New Zealand ought to be reconsidered, and this
new proposal provides an optimal framework on which to base a new defence.
‘His home is his castle. And mine is a cage’
243 Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 54(5)–(6).
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